In a probabilistic universe, different possible futures have different chances of occurring. We can think of the chance distribution at t as a probability measure on the class of those metaphysically possible worlds that are compatible with the actual history up to t and with the actual laws of nature. Given this connection between chance and modality, one's views about modal space can have significant implications for the theory of physical chance, and one's modal views can be evaluated in part by how plausible these implications are. I apply this methodology to two influential modal theses. The first of these is the view, proposed by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, that many individuals have their modal features contingently. This thesis can be shown to entail that the present chances of various events are partly determined by the outcomes of future chance processes. As a result, the account yields a cluster of problematic consequences that are usually associated with Humean frequentist accounts of chance and which are known as "the problem of undermining futures." The second account I consider is the thesis (held by a number of philosophers) that the existence of a possible world w depends on the existence of the contingent individuals that exist at w, and that many possible worlds are therefore contingent existents. The problem of undermining arises for this view as well, although in a milder form.
Modality and chance
The philosophical literature is full of debates about the general features of the space of metaphysically possible worlds: its plenitude, the ways worlds can differ, whether the features of the space are themselves necessary, and so forth. To decide such disputes, it seems natural to compare the modal statements underwritten by the competing views for their plausibility, including possibility and necessity claims and counterfactuals. But often these data are inconclusive. I aim to show that some well-known debates about modality can be made more tractable by considering an additional source of evidence: the implications of the rival positions for the theory of physical chance.
The connection between modality and chance is straightforward: There can be a nonzero chance at t that P only if it is metaphysically possible that P. Moreover, we can think of the sample space of the chance distribution at t as a set of metaphysically possible scenarios. To be more specific, the chance distribution at time t can be regarded as a probability measure on the set of what we may call the 'possibilities that are open at t', that is, the metaphysically possible worlds that are like actuality through t and that never violate the actual laws. Under determinism the actual world is the only open possibility and it has a 100% chance of being actualized, while under indeterminism chances may be spread out more widely over worlds. Ordinary chance claims can be explained in this framework. For example, the present chance that it will rain in New York City tomorrow equals the present chance measure of the set of open possibilities where it rains in New York City tomorrow. More generally:
(MC) Necessarily, for any proposition P and time t, P's chance at t equals x iff the chance measure at t of the set of open possibilities where P is true is defined and equals x.
I will call this claim the Modality-Chance Principle (MC).
Thanks to these connections between modality and chance, one's views about the shape of modal space can have significant implications in the philosophy of chance, and it is a desideratum for a good theory of modality that its implications in this area should be plausible. This general requirement imposes a number of more specific constraints on an account of modal space. By considering each of these constraints in turn and determining which views satisfy it and which do not, we can gradually narrow down the range of theories consistent with a satisfactory account of chance. The results will have implications for various ongoing disputes in the philosophy of modality, since the competing positions will be supported or disconfirmed to the extent that they meet the constraints.
One relevant constraint is discussed in Author a: an account of modality should afford a sufficiently rich sample space for physical chance. I argued that this desideratum can be brought to bear on the debate about haecceitism. Haecceitists hold that two possible worlds can be qualitatively alike-in the sense that they feature the same pattern of instantiation of purely qualitative properties and relations-but differ in how things stand with specific individuals.
1,2 Anti-haecceitists believe the opposite. On their account, all facts globally supervene on the qualitative facts: no two possible worlds differ in any way at all without differing qualitatively. I tried to show that anti-haecceitism does not yield a rich enough sample space for physical chance. My goal in the present paper is to argue that some haecceitist views have implausible consequences about chance as well. I will attempt to show this by considering a second constraint that some influential haecceitist views fail to meet: a good account of modality should avoid what is known as the problem of undermining.
This problem is usually discussed as a difficulty for Humean frequentist accounts of chance. 3 Frequentists believe that the laws of chance are determined by the frequencies of different patterns of events throughout the history of the universe. On this view, the present chances of different possible futures depend in part on future frequencies. But these may themselves depend on how future chance processes will turn out. It may therefore be presently chancy what the present chances are: event E may have a 50%
chance right now, but there may also be a non-zero present chance that E's present chance is not 50%. Adopting a term introduced by David Lewis, we can describe such cases by saying that the present chances 'undermine themselves'. As is well-known, the fact that frequentists are committed to the possibility of undermining forces them to abandon some very compelling principles about chance.
The problem of undermining does not affect frequentism alone. It can arise for any account that entails that the present chances depend on facts that are determined by future chance processes. Now, the present chances depend in part on the modal facts, since (as mentioned above) the present chance that P can be greater than zero only if it is metaphysically possible that P. Any theory that entails that the relevant modal facts in 1 I am roughly following David Lewis's definition of 'haecceitism' (Lewis 1986b, Sect. 4.4) . The term 'haecceitism' is due to David Kaplan (1975, pp. 722-3.) . See Adams 1974 , 1981 , Lewis 1968 , 1986b , Skow 2008 , Fara 2009 , Stalnaker 2011 , and Author a for some discussions of haecceitism and antihaecceitism.
2 By 'purely qualitative property' I mean, roughly speaking, a property whose instantiation by a certain individual x is in no way a matter of which specific individual x is or which specific individuals x is related to. The properties of being Katie's sister, of being French, and of being a Marxist are not qualitative, while those of being a quark and of having a certain mass arguably are qualitative. 3 See Lewis 1994 , Thau 1994 , Hall 1994 turn depend on the outcomes of future chance processes is at risk of generating undermining cases.
I will try to show that this problem arises for two well-known haecceitist views. The feature that these views share, and which makes them susceptible to the problem of undermining, is that they entail that de re modal facts about specific individuals are often contingent, and that under indeterminism such contingent modal facts may be the outcomes of chance processes. However, the two theories motivate these theses in quite different ways. The first view, proposed by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, starts from examples that seem to show that many individuals have their modal features contingently-they could have had different modal profiles from the ones they actually have. I will call this theory modal-profile contingentism (MPC) and will discuss it in section 2. As will be shown below, MPC has many of the same implausible implications as frequentism. The second view argues for the contingency of de re modal facts from the observation that many individuals are contingent existents. This account, which I will call modal existence contingentism (MEC), will be the topic of section 3. MEC comes in different forms and not every version of it entails that undermining cases are possible.
However, we will see that one well-known variant (proposed by Robert Adams among others) does have this consequence, though the resulting difficulties for the view are less severe than those for MPC.
Modal-profile contingentism

The case for contingent modal profiles
Consider the following familiar line of reasoning, due to Hugh Chandler (1976) and Nathan Salmon (1979; 1982, pp. 238-40) . Suppose that your living-room is graced with a wooden It also seems plausible that Necessity and Tolerance do not just happen to hold at the actual world-by metaphysical coincidence, as it were-but are true at all possible worlds.
By Tolerance, there is a possible world that meets the following description:
w 1 : Woody is made from XBC.
Since Tolerance also holds at w 1 , it is true at w 1 that there exists a possible world that satisfies the following description:
w 2 : Woody is made from XYC.
But by Necessity, there does not actually exist such a possible world. (w 2 may exist at the actual world, but only as an impossible world.) So, it is possibly possible that Woody is made from XYC, but it is not possible. The following schema is consequently invalid:
where '◊ M ' is the metaphysical possibility operator. Similarly, we obtain a counterexample to the following schema (which is equivalent to (S4◊ M ) if the metaphysical necessity operator '□ M ' is inter-definable with '◊ M ' in the usual way): However, I will argue in the next couple of sections that MPC has implausible implications about chance that make it considerably less attractive overall. In preparation for this argument, it will be necessary to distinguish two versions of MPC that require slightly different treatment (section 2.2). The first version will be discussed in sections 2.3-2.4. I will try to show that this view gives rise to undermining cases and that, as a result of this fact, it violates a number of very compelling principles about chance. In section 2.5 I will argue that many of these arguments also apply (in slightly different form) to the second version of MPC. If we reject MPC for the reasons I will discuss, then we face the question of how we should accommodate the data that motivated MPC. Section 2.6 will briefly discuss some of the options. This principle seems extremely plausible, but it is violated by the undermining scenarios generated by frequentism.
Two versions of modal-profile contingentism
As mentioned in the introduction, the problem of undermining can arise for any theory according to which the present chances are partly determined by the outcomes of future chance processes. MPC is one such position. Remember that if P is metaphysically impossible, then P's chance must be zero at all times. That means that P's present chance may depend on whether P is metaphysically possible. MPC in turn entails that P may be metaphysically possible at one possible world but not at another. Moreover, which of these worlds is actualized may itself depend on the outcomes of future chance processes.
Let us consider an illustration of this problem, focusing for now on a version of MPC that endorses Sufficiency. I will use 'ABC W ' both as an abbreviation of 'Woody is made from ABC' and as a name for the proposition expressed by this sentence (a convenient ambiguity that is harmless in the present context). 'BCD W ' and 'CDE W ' are to be understood analogously.
Moreover, 'CDE' will be used as an abbreviation for 'A table is made from CDE' and as a name for the proposition expressed by this sentence. Figure 1 represents the situation at the actual world (which I will call '@'): The black path represents the course that events are in fact taking, while the unrealized possibilities that are open at t (i.e. at the time just before you are spinning the wheel) are represented in grey. Note that the following is actually true:
The situation at w 1 is represented in Figure 2 . ('CDE' in Figure 2 Principle (OPP), which was proposed by David Lewis in his 1986a. According to OPP, your credence in P conditional on the assumption that ch t (P)=x ought to equal x as long as you have no 'inadmissible' evidence relative to P and t, i.e. as long as your evidence bears on whether P holds only by bearing on what P's chance was at t. (This condition is typically satisfied if you have no evidence about the outcomes of post-t chance processes that is relevant to P.) Some MPC-generated undermining cases give rise to violations of OPP. Consider a version of Example 1 in which you (the carpenter) explain to me the procedure by which you will decide from which parts to make a It is unclear how much proponents of MPC should be worried by the fact that their view generates such counterexamples to OPP. These counterexamples concern an agent's credence in singular propositions, and there are independent reasons for thinking that OPP yields false predictions when applied to such singular beliefs. (Cf. Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio 2009, p. 97 . Also see Chalmers 2011 for relevant discussion.) It seems that OPP needs to be revised in response to these counterexamples in any case, and it is possible that once the revisions have been made, the resulting principle will be consistent with MPC. It is also worth mentioning that that the (admittedly less compelling) undermining-resistant 'New Principal Principle' (NPP) proposed by Lewis (1994) and Hall (1994) can be shown to be consistent with MPC.
Expected future chances and the logic of open possibility
Sitting in front of two buttons, you are about to throw a fair six-sided die. If it lands 6, you will push the left button, an action that has an 80% chance of causing an explosion. If any other number comes up, you will push the button on the right instead, giving the explosion a 20% chance of occurring. What is the current chance of an explosion?
Obviously, it is 1 / 6 × 80% + 5 / 6 × 20% = 30%. The current chance equals the average of the different possible future chances, weighted by the present chances of these future chances. This exemplifies the following very plausible general rule ('t < u' abbreviates 't is earlier than u'):
Expected-Chance Principle (ECP). For any times t and u such that t < u, ch t (P) equals the expected value, relative to the chance distribution at t, of P's chance at u (provided that this expected value and ch t (P) are defined).
Applications of (ECP) are arguably ubiquitous in ordinary reasoning about chances. Your team tends to win games that take place after rain showers, but does poorly otherwise. To calculate your team's present chance of winning the game tonight, you estimate the present chance that it will rain in the afternoon, and then estimate the chances of winning relative to the present chances, of the chance of winning that your team will have tonight.
And that, in turn, is your best estimate of the present chance of victory.
Another principle that is closely related to (but less powerful than) ECP seems even more compelling:
Some Chance Principle. For any times t and u such that t < u, if there is a nonzero chance at t that there will be a non-zero chance at u that it will be the case that P, then there is a non-zero chance at t that it will be the case that P (provided that the chance at t that it will be the case that P is defined).
For example, if there is some chance now that there will some chance tomorrow that we will win next week, then there is some chance now that we will win.
This second principle is closely related to a third one that deserves our attention as well. However, before considering this third principle, we need to broaden the way we think about chance. As mentioned before, P's chance is naturally taken to measure the strength of the universe's tendency to evolve so as to make P true. But a scale from 0 to 1 does not seem sufficient to capture all facts about the strength of that tendency. It misses important distinctions among propositions with chance zero and among those whose chance is one. Imagine a world that is indeterministic, but not pervasively so. Some future occurrences are determined to happen by the past and the laws, while others are matters of chance. You are about to throw a dart with a point-sized (infinitely small) tip at a dartboard. The history up to now and the laws necessitate that you will hit some point on the board, but do not necessitate any stronger claims about where the dart will land.
Which point you hit is a matter of chance, and the chance density function is constant over all locations on the dartboard (i.e. any two measurable regions of the same size have the same chance of being hit). Then any point p on the board has a zero chance of being hit, and any point p* that is not on the board also has a zero chance. But there is an important difference: given the past and the laws, it is still an open question whether or not the dart will hit p, but it is already settled that it will not hit p*. There is a sense in which the dart has an even lower tendency to hit p* than it does to hit p-its hitting p* is precluded in a way in which its hitting p is not. Similarly, the chance is one that the dart will hit some point on the board, and the chance is also one that the dart will hit some point on the board other than p. But its tendency to hit some point on the board is stronger than its tendency to hit some point on the board other than p, since the former event is pre-determined to happen while the latter is not.
Let us say that it is an open possibility at t that P just in case the proposition that P is compossible with the history through t and the laws, and that it is settled at t that P just in case the history through t and the laws together necessitate that P. Then on a natural extension of the ordinary concept of chance, there are different ways of having chance zero. Or rather, as I prefer to put it, the expression 'chance zero' covers different chances that a proposition can have (the chances of two propositions can differ without differing numerically). The assumption that the proposition that P has a chance of zero at t is consistent with its being settled at t that ¬P but also with its being an open possibility at t that P. In the first case the proposition that P has the lowest of all possible chances, in the second case it has a higher chance than that. In other words: Given a chance measure over the space of open possibilities, P has the lowest possible chance iff P is not true at any world in the space. P has chance zero but not the lowest possible chance iff the P-
worlds among the open possibilities form a non-empty set whose chance measure is zero.
The expression 'chance one' covers different chances as well. If the proposition that P has a chance of one, then it might be that it is settled that it will be the case that P, or it might be that it is still an open possibility that it will be the case that ¬P. The proposition that P has a higher chance in the first case than in the second.
With the notion of an open possibility clearly in focus, we can formulate another principle, which I will call
Open Possibility Principle. For any times t and u such that t < u, if it is an open possibility at t that it will be an open possibility at u that it will be the case that P, then it is an open possibility at t that it will be the case that P.
This principle says about open possibility what the Some Chance Principle says about the slightly stronger property of having a non-zero chance. And it seems equally compelling.
If it is still an open possibility now that it will be an open possibility tomorrow that P, then it cannot already be settled now that ¬P.
MPC yields counterexamples to all three principles stated in this section. Consider
Example 2. At time t, you resolve to toss a fair coin to decide whether to make a Since Woody is actually made from ABC, it follows by Necessity that it is impossible for Woody to be made from CDE. Hence, at the actual world,
Moreover, it is true at the actual world that (6) ch t ({w 1 }) = ¼
The situation at w 1 is depicted in Figure 4 . At w 1 , BCD W is true and CDE W is therefore metaphysically possible. Moreover, 
it is an open possibility at t that it will be the case that P (i.e. it is metaphysically compossible with the history up to t and the laws that it will be the case that P)
it is settled at t that it will be the case that P (i.e. the history up to t and the laws metaphysically necessitate that it will be the case that P)
We can formulate the following pair of principles for these operators:
OP P for any times t and u such that t < u
OP P for any times t and u such that t < u Secondly, consider the operators ◊ t SOP P: the chance at t is greater than zero that it will be the case that P □ t SOP P: the chance at t is one that it will be the case that P
We can think of the claim that ◊ t SOP P as telling us that it is an open possibility that it will be the case that P in a stronger sense than is given by the claim that ◊ t OP P. is settled now that P, then it is settled now that it will be settled tomorrow that P-or in other words, it cannot already be settled now that P but still be an open possibility that it will not be settled tomorrow whether P. S4◊ t SOP is simply the Some Chance Principle, which also seems very plausible. S4□ t SOP seems equally compelling: if the present chance that P is one, then the present chance is one that the chance that P at any future time will be one.
It is perhaps not surprising that we have much stronger views about the formal
properties of open possibility and strong open possibility than about those of metaphysical possibility. Unlike the notions of metaphysical modality, the concept of chance and its associated modal operators figure prominently in ordinary (nonphilosophical) thinking. In particular, it seems likely that outside the philosophy room we are almost never concerned with entailment relations between claims that contain iterated metaphysical modal operators and claims containing a single such operator. By contrast, the above examples of applications of ECP suggest that we do sometimes draw inferences from iterated chance ascriptions (claims about present chances of future chances) to non-iterated ones (to claims about present chances).
The foregoing line of reasoning shows that the modal-profile contingentists' rejection of the S4-principles for metaphysical modality requires them to reject the S4-principles for open possibility and strongly open possibility as well, and that is a significant cost.
This argument brings out one of the reasons why it can be useful in evaluating a theory about metaphysical modality to consider its implications about chance: it allows us to draw on powerful pre-philosophical opinions about chance in cases where we have no similarly strong views about metaphysical modality.
MPC without sufficiency
The argument I gave in section 2.3 for the conclusion that Example 1 is a case of undermining relied crucially on the assumption of Sufficiency. Moreover, it is not clear that denying Sufficiency allows MPC-ists to avoid the real problem with the view that undermining is possible. According to the definition given in section 2.3, the chances at t undermine themselves iff (10) For some proposition X and real number x, ch t (X) = x but there is a non-zero chance at t that ch t (X) ≠ x.
What makes it so implausible to say that undermining is possible is that in undermining (11) does not require the truth of (10). For, in order for (11) sufficient that S be non-empty). Moreover, while the chances at t at the worlds in S need to differ from the actual chances at t, they do not need to differ numerically. (As we saw in section 2.4, not all differences between chances are numerical differences.) For example, (11) is true if (i) the proposition that P has chance zero at t and it is settled at t that ¬P, and (ii) there are open possibilities at t where the proposition that P also has chance zero at t, but where it is not settled at t that ¬P. It does not matter whether the set of these open possibilities has a chance measure greater than zero.
I will say that the chances at t weakly undermine themselves if (11) is true, and that they strongly undermine themselves if (10) 
Alternatives to MPC
The discussion of the last couple of sections does not provide knockdown arguments against MPC. But then, the goal was not to give a definitive refutation of the view, but to point out one of its significant costs that should be taken into consideration in any costbenefit analysis. The alternatives to MPC that are open to haecceitists have drawbacks as well, and it is a matter of judgement which view is most attractive all things considered.
It is of course beyond the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive list of theoretical options and of their pros and cons. But to get some idea of the lay of the land, let us briefly run through the most prominent candidates.
Anyone who rejects MPC-I will call such a philosopher a modal-profile necessitarian-needs to reject at least one of the premisses used in the argument for MPC given in section 2.1. The crucial question is which premiss should be given up. The first option is to deny (1) and the principle of Necessity of which (1) is an instance: Woody could have been made from parts entirely different from those he was actually made from. The main drawback of this view is that (1) seems pretty plausible and has been supported with forceful arguments by Kripke and other philosophers. The second option is to deny (2) and the principle of Tolerance of which (2) This form of mereological essentialism is problematic as well, since it portrays Woody's existence as much more precarious than we normally take it to be.
Another version of modal-profile necessitarianism agrees with MPC that (1) and (2) are true, thereby avoiding the cost of the two views described in the preceding paragraph.
However, unlike MPC, this account takes (1) and (2) space by other worlds of a less orderly variety, we may start to wonder how we can be so sure that our world is an orderly one. An account that commits us to such absurdities deserves to be rejected.
However, the modal-profile necessitarian can avoid these problematic consequences by giving a different account of the metaphysical order governing the facts of de re modality. One such account rests on a familiar view that is sometimes called 'multithingism', 9 and which can be motivated by considerations that are independent of the present topic. Multi-thingism tells us that for any material object m, there are other objects that have the same non-modal features as m-in particular, they occupy the same space-time region-but which differ in their modal properties. As a famous example, the multi-thinger may cite Allan Gibbard's case of the statue, which is necessarily statueshaped, and the lump of clay it is made of, which occupies the same region but has its shape contingently (Gibbard 1975) . Multi-thingism comes in different versions and not all of them can serve the needs of the modal-profile necessitarian. To fix ideas, let us focus on one specific version that does the job (we could call it 'maximal multithingism'). According to this view, the range of modal profiles exemplified by physical objects is as large as it can coherently be held to be. Very roughly speaking, for any physical object m and any set S of properties that m has, if it is coherent to assume that there is a physical object that has the same non-modal features as m and which has all and only the properties in S necessarily, then there is such an object. (This is merely a theory schema that needs to be fleshed in by specifying the conditions of coherence, among other things, but let us not digress to consider how this should be done.) The maximal multi-thinger can say that at a possible world w where Woody was made from BCD rather than ABC, it is still necessary that Woody (if he exists) is made from at least There has been much philosophical discussion about the virtues and vices of multithingism and about whether and how it can make sense of the utterances we make and the beliefs we hold outside the philosophy room. This is not the place to review this debate.
For present purposes, the important point is to observe that multi-thingism provides one alternative to MPC that merits further exploration. 
Modal-existence contingentism
A number of haecceitists-including Kit Fine, Robert Adams, and Robert Stalnaker- hold that the existence of many worlds and many propositions is metaphysically contingent (Fine 1977 (Fine , 1985 Adams 1981; Stalnaker 2011; Author b (Fine 1977 (Fine , 1985 Adams 1981; Stalnaker 2011, Sect. 2 where Woody exists either. There is simply no possible world in which Q is true.)
11 Also see McMichael 1983 for an argument that actualists should accept a version of this view. 12 It is of course possible for haecceitists to resist this argument by denying one of the premisses. For example, Plantinga (1976 Plantinga ( , 1983 ) develops a haecceitist position according to which worlds do not existentially depend on the contingent individuals that exist at them. (See Fine 1985 for critical discussion of Plantinga's position, see Plantinga 1985 for a reply.) And Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996) and Williamson (1998 Williamson ( , 1999 Williamson ( , 2013 argue that it is impossible for anything to exist contingently. (12) is true at all possible worlds, and in particular whether it is true at possible worlds at which Woody does not exist. MEC theorists disagree with each other on that question. Some believe that (12) is necessarily equivalent to the following claim:
(13) There is a possible world at which Woody exists.
In other words, they believe that (12) is true at just those possible worlds at which (13) MEC 1 theorists may be inclined to say that the claim that ch t (Woody will exist) = x asserts that a certain relation (viz., the relation of being-the-chance-of) holds between the number x and the proposition that Woody exists. They could then argue as follows: Since the proposition that Woody exists does not exist at a Woody-less world, the proposition cannot stand in relations to other things at such a world. Consequently, at such a world there cannot be a number x to which the proposition stands in the relation described by the proposition that ch t (Woody will exist) = x.
When combined with (17), MEC 1 violates ECP. To see this, consider: zero) that is the chance at t 1 of the proposition that Woody will exist. Consequently, at the actual world the expected value of ch t 1 (Woody will exist), relative to the chance distribution at t, is undefined. So, ECP does not apply to the example.
MEC 1 in general, and the version of MEC 1 that endorses (18) in particular, are less revisionary of our ordinary views about chance than MPC. Again, it is a matter of judgement how to weigh the implausible implications that remain against other relevant desiderata. Those attracted to MEC can avoid undermining cases by endorsing MEC 2 rather than MEC 1 , but only if they are willing to reject the necessary equivalence of (12) with (13). Alternatively, given that the problem of undermining that confronts MEC 1 is fairly moderate, MEC theorists may decide to endorse MEC 1 and to accept the undermining cases.
Summary and conclusion
In order to be compatible with a plausible account of chance, a theory about modal space needs to satisfy a number of requirements. I discussed one of these desiderata in previous work and argued that only haecceitist views satisfy it. But endorsing haecceitism is not enough to avoid implausible consequences about physical chance. The present paper aimed to show this by considering a second constraint: a theory of modality should be consistent with the cluster of very compelling principles about chance stated in sections 2.3-2.4. An account may violate this requirement if it gives rise to undermining cases.
This problem besets two widely discussed haecceitist theories, MPC and MEC 1 . The difficulties for MPC are significant enough to provide strong motivation for endorsing one of the alternative views sketched in section 2.6. By contrast, the version of the problem that arises for MEC 1 is comparatively mild, and MEC 1 theorists may simply decide to bite the bullet.
The discussion of the undermining problem in this paper illustrates why it can be helpful in deciding controversies about modality to consider the implications of the competing views for the theory of chance: it allows us to draw on pre-theoretical opinions about chance that are often much firmer than those about metaphysical modality. 15 
